On December 1-2, the representatives of the six Common Market countries met in the Hague. To judge from the results of this conference, precise answers must be given to certain questions concerning the Common Market. These questions are more complex than they might seem at first glance.
Socially, the Common Market is a "superstructure", that is, a body of legal institutions of a semi-governmental type set up by the European bourgeoisie to defend their interests against their enemies (the working class and the non-capitalist states of East Europe) and their competitors (above all, American imperi alism).
Economically, the Common Market is an expression of the growing internation. al interpenetration of capital in capitalist Europe. It is therefore a product of the international concentration of capital which existed to a certain degree previously, and at the same time it serves as a stimulus in bringing this concentration to a higher level.
Juridically, the Common Market is a peculiar form of international capitalist 'integration" limited to six countrie and supported by specific institutions (a common external tariff, agricultural protectionism, etc.), which are the result of laborious negotiations among the various bourgeois classes belonging to the EEC.
Politically, the Common Market reflects a pattern of forces which are very tangled but which in general have been frozen on the basis of the relationships existing among the classes and imperialst powers in 1958 for years we reached the same conclu sion in our analyses. The Hague conference has confirmed this once again.
A year ago, at the time of the November 1968 monetary panic, various European journals appeared simultaneously with the headline, "Deutsch Mark, Deutsch Mark Uber Alles", After the Hague conference, most commentators noted that West Germany has now established a discreet political leadership within the Common Market. Some romantics attribute this to the disappearance of "General de Gaulle's strong personality" from the European political scene. Obviously there is nothing to this.
It was not the disappearance of de Gaulle that opened up the way for the drab Willy Brandt to become the "leader mon Market was based on included the of free Europe"; it was the rise of German imperialism moving towards political hegemony in Europe that was one of rial products enter duty free-which will the reasons for de Gaulle's disappearance.
If a section of the French bourgeoisie decided at the time of the last referendum to rid itself of de Gaulle, it was because the General had "obstructed" the functioning of the EEC in such a way as to directly threaten survival of the Common Market. Blackmail is, in fact, a weapon that can be used on both sides of a negotiating table. And it happens that the French bourgeoisie today needs the Common Market more than do the West Germans.
The French capitalists sell 45% of their exports in the Common Market area, the West Germans only 37%. In view of the different starting positions of has deteriorated markedly from the the two capitalisms, the race was decided in advance.
The rise of West German imperialism in the past ten years has been primarily a result of its economic and financial power. It has been realised despite pronounced military weakness and despite a to open negotiations in the near future crisis of political leadership which has long hampered Bonn's diplomacy within the framework of the imperialist world.
Now, ten years after the Treaty of Rome (which provided the establishment served "oui"
of the Common Market by stages) went nto effect, the relationsni of forces is 10 longer the same as in 1958. Despite has been far out-distanced by its West German ally and rival.
In 1958 West German and French total exports were valued respectively at $6.4 billion and $4 billion; in 1968 this proportion had become $15.5 and $T billion. Some unkind observers even say that this was because of "the General's personal gadgets", because, if French capitalism had invested the money wasted in building the "force de frappe" (striking force) in ultramodern factories and machines, it would have been better able to get the jump on its competitors.
West German imperialism's economic and financial dominance has, moreover, had another unexpected result. During these years the Gaullist regime sought to be the champion of a "detente" and "technical collaboration" with the USSR. But in this affair as in many others, the General's eyes were bigger than his stomach (or his treasury).
All that was necessary was for Brandt to succeed Kiesinger and for West German diplomacy to shift its line slightly, and Moscow agreed to open up its doors to a promising East-West trade, which has brought the Mannesmann trust the biggest order the USSR has ever given to a Western capitalist firm (including the famous FIAT order). As can be seen, in commerce as in war, God is definitely on the side of the big battalions.
The delicate compromise the Comollowing quid pro quo: We (th 'rench) will let 'your' (German) indust subsidies to 'our' big cereal producers and sugar-beet growers, including those who impose their tribute on these produets (the sugar industry, the big agricultural exporters, the food industry, ete.)"
This compromise also reflected complex relations of forces in France, an unstable balance among various social forces, that made Gaullist bonapartism highly sensitive to the reactions of the "notables who politically controlled the French countryside.
Now, ten years later, the relationship of forces within the Common Market standpoint of the French bourgeoisie. Now, in order to get what it had already won in 1958—i.e. a common agricultural policy-French imperialism had to make an important additional concession.
The French imperialists had to agree with Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway for membership in the EEC. In place of the General's flat "net" there was Pompidou's sullen and re Of course, the matter is by no means settled. The Six must negotiate with each other on how the negotiations with ialism will stand virtually alone against the desire of its partners in the EEC to broaden the Common Market.
The reasons for this alignment are diverse (in the case of Germany, and partally Italy, the hope of winning new markets: the Benelux countries want spe cial ties with British imperialism; the Ita lians and Benelux countries hope to "neutralise" German or French dominance through the British role, etc.)
But this alignment is a fact. It does not leave Paris much choice since the obstruction has been eliminated. Eithef French imperialism, putting up a good o the Common Market once and at of the Common the expense of sectors of its internal market, or it will have to pull out of the game. The latter possibility is by n means excluded.
The paradox in the situation is that while French imperialism is sacrificing a art of its industrial interests to defenc hose of the richest layers of the Frenc peasantry (and industrial and financial circles specially linked to these layers), the mass of the French peasantry is more discontented than ever and has entered into almost open rebellion against the agricultural policy of the government and against the Common Market!
This, moreover, is one of the reasons why there has been a shift in the economic imperatives of French imperialism, the interests of the export industries holding assured outlets in the EEC exerting today a greater weight than those of the big peasantry in determining the attachment to the Common Market.
Therefore, it is within French industry —in the conflicts between the firms and sectors facing the risk of losing their out lets it Great Britain joins and those tac ing the risk of losing their outlets in the Ernest Mandel.
Common Market if it breaks up-that the future of the Common Market is being decided today. The rest is just rhetoric, even when the "loftiest sentiments" are invoked.
The future of the Common Market obviously does not depend solely on the conflicts of interest within the EEC. It depends also on developments in a broader context.
Two movements have been in progress for some months in the international capitalist economy which in part determined the attitude of the participants at the Hague conference the beginning of the American recession and the drop in the price of gold. These two movements are linked together. that the inflation of the dollar will soon be halted. As a result the demand for gold is diminishing. The revaluation of the deutsch mark and the (temporary) re-establishment of the British balance of payments has done the rest.
But the link between these two move tente" inthe international monetary cri- which has been producing a "de sis, is entirely temporary. The detente hinges exclusively on the minimal character that the recession has had so far in the USA If this recession does not deepen, there is no reason for storm signals to go up in Paris, Frankfurt, Zurich, or the City of London. If the Americah reces sion were to worsen, instead of produc ing a detente, it would cause a profound crisis of the international monetary system and world trade A deepening recession in the United States would have the initial effect of re ducing the market in America and several Third World countries for exports from Great Britain and the EEC. The re establishment of the British balance of payments would be finished. The expan sion of Common Market exports to th USA would be finished An intensified recession would have as its second effect a resurgence of the inflation of the dollar. It is unthinkable that American imperialism, hard-pressed everywhere, would assume the additiona burden of millions more unemployed (and the social crisis this would involve) for long. But renewed inflation of the dollar could not help but revive the inter national monetary crisis.
All these perspectives-and some others besides-are chilling to the experts of the European bourgeoisie. To prevent the worst, to check new assaults of speculation, to prevent a general panic in the event of a deepening American recession or monetary crisis, these experts would ike to open up a process leading to th reation of a European currenc Appeals along this line would have stead ily multiplied for years in the most "re sponsible" imperialist circles At the Hague a modest "first step" was made toward a European currency But it was a first step that could be with drawn at the first pretext. Here also no definite commitments were made and nothing was definitively decided everything depends on the struggle in the months and years to come among antag onistic social, political and economic forces.
In this struggle, the European working class has not yet made its collective and international voice heard. The internatio: nal of the trusts and the bankers is still ahead of the international of the workers. But while the capitalist international is by nature divided, riven, and rent by the imperatives of profit and competi tion, the workers international, in spite of a multitude of obstacles and difficul ties. is relearning the basic lessons of international solidarity.
The workers' movement is paving the way through the French May which has spread in a special form to Italy. It is paving the way by the factory occupa tions that are continuing in France. It is paving the way through the still timid and hesitating contacts developing among the automobile, chemical, electrical, construction, and dock workers in various countries who are threatened by dangers, manipulated by the same trusts, and subjected to the same diktats from the same capitalists Tomorrow this advance will lead to joint actions by workers in several coun tries. The day after tomorrow it will lead to a combined struggle for a socia list United States of Europe. It is this Europe, and not the Europe of the Hague, that will attract the hopes of the
a repressive law prohibiting peaceful pub30th January 19A