sulting from the armed Palestinian presence a Lebanese soil.
The appearance of Palestinian bases in south Lebanon confronted the Lebanese bourgeoisie sta a tragic dilemma: if they liquidated these they would arouse reactions from the ›gressive" Arab states and the revolt of the banese Moslem masses; but if they failed to date the cancerous intrusion, it would ace the very foundations of Lebanese alism, supported by an emerging Lebanese mutionary left which called in question the established status quo of which the banese Communist Party had formed a ve left wing.
The events of April and October 1969, like e of today, were attempts to resolve this ma for the benefit of imperialist interests he area.
APRIL 1969 Lebanese state found an ingenious solution the problem: exploiting Lebanese vinism and presenting the liquidation of edayeen bases as an armed struggle against Baathist plots to infiltrate Lebanon ch Saiga (the Syrian regime's "Palestinian ion organisation"). he Lebanese petit-bourgeoisie, Moslem as is Christian, applauded the government's believing they were dealing with the ionist plans of a country whose nic level is not to be envied and whose look for seasonal employment in er, very embarrassed by his losses on the front, had to remain an impartial ner. Syria, isolated, protested in the most ent terms, thus only giving credence to official theory.
De every level the conjuncture seemed tious for carrying out the plan. But that o forget the Palestinians of the refuge And to miscalculate the influence of the se revolutionary forces on the masses. i reply to the army's massacres of the een, the population of Saida-first to learn e nature of events rose up. In the after of the same day, in spite of a rapidly ed curfew, a demonstration organised by abanese Left took place. The state, if it keep to its plans, could only suppress it.
e resulting massacre of April 23rd outed even the government's expectation's orror! The anger of the masses rose and turadio, another unforeseen element, *g the plot, called on the people to tendency of the state was to promise. The government, having failed in i, collapsed: Moslem ministers.
ally President of the Council Rachid e, to aroid being compromised and diled in the eyes of the electorate, was a return to the status quo which, it marked the defeat of the state, allowed prepare a new offensive.
FOLLOWING PERIOD = 1969 was catastrophe for the U.S.
progressive" coups d'etat in and especially in Libya (a rising oil and imperialist military base) made the n of the problems created by the last regression urgent, for it had become the at and axis of political transformation in rab world. Implementation of the U.N.
on of 22nd Nov. 1967-providing a al solution most favourable to 1 imperialism —was necessary.
military base of the U.S., was very ed in such a solution but wrangled over ms of diplomatic contact-an rehensible temporisation if Israel did not to save the Hussein from a direct, and fatal, confrontation with the fedayeen,, poses the liquidation of the Palestiniaon" se implementation of a "
Son which is the principal stumbling in such a path. The decaying kingdom of s in the country, was to be the sounding , the experimenter.
October, April, or at least the Syrian farce, ded itself. The plot was threadbare, the acted without taking the trouble to e its acts. Why this unaccustomed fer the blow of the "Mirage"(1), an can-inspired attempt to discredit the 1 Union and a brilliant operation of the and after a propaganda campaign ry coordinated with the help of rations by government agents in the south ing against the presence of the fidayeen ere presented as criminals and hooligans, can assurances, made known to the through the communiques of the U.S. sy, allowed the army to act fearlessly. It ed, but came to tial with the Moslem Lebanese masses Lebanese capitalism, intermediary between the imperialist west and the Arab interior, and then tributary of the second as well as the first, risked extimetion, all the more since the attitude of the Arab countries could bring about a popular insurrection far more important than the comedy of the barricades raised n Beirut by che henchmen of the Second Bureau(2) with the sole opportunist aim of keeping the political initiative to be able to encapsulate the masses.
The second attempt fell to the ground.
The same ministerial picture: Karame presented his resignation after five months of fruitless approaches for the formation of a ministry.
Egypt offered its good offices. The Lebanese state, up against the wall, sent a delegation to Cairo to sign the famous agreement, the consecration of a smarting defeat, for it legalised the action of the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon.
The Lebanese government temporarily resigned itself to s failure, but very temporarily, since a scrap of paper never prevented the bourgeoisie from defending its interests. But this time it was a matter of changing tactics.
The military coup d'etat, an extreme solution recoiled from so far because it was in contradiction with the liberal nature of the Lebanese economy, must be more seriously To begin with it was necessary for the military bureaucracy holding the reins of power to strengthen its position in the state apparatus. A ministry of "national unity' was cicalcu whose name deceived nobody: its "Nahjist" domination was obvious (the civilian nickname of the military bureaucracy). Then faced with the growing popularity of General Boustany(3), making him a rival of the actual army chiefl4), one of the most classical lines of action was used: purging disguised as retirement. Boustany tried to protest, but was rapidly quietened by some dollars accompanied bv 'friendly advice" Another classic method. Then the preparation of the new Joumblat(5) was not in a post as important as Minister of the Interior by democratic wish or pure chance. He had been put there to be With his "national" and *progressive halo" Joumblat could do what done by others would have sparked off shackles on le action o what he did and he did it well.
The "progressive' and "socialist" Joumblat restrieted the movements of the fedayeen in the south. His personal clown, the Communist Party, applauded The progressive and socialist Joumblat triec to introduce police into the refugee camps. His personal clown applauded.
The progressive and socialist Joumblat mercilessly dislodged the southern refugees of Mkalles in the name of the integrity of the state. His personal clown applauded louder.
Ill this happened without arousing any popular protest; the organisations of the resistance, essentially Fatah, were the first to be fooled. The CLAP occupied itself less and less with the assembling of the revolutionary forces and more and more with Joumblat, thus isolating itself from the Lebanese masses. of Moukihtara" in chorus.
In this general apotheosis Joumblat began to play his own game. Progressive "Arabist"
personality, popular among the Moslems and applauded by the Christian right, he filled Ideally the requirements for a governor of the country.
Verbally supporting the fedayeen, backed by the Lebanese Communist Party, while organising the repression of the fedayeen applauded by the Christian right, Joumblat gave free rein to his personal ambitions.
He brandished his demands: abolition of the denominational principle, election of the President of the republic by universal suffrage.
*The Constitution does not prevent me from canvassing for the Presideney, he declared.
Moreover hadn't Newsweek promoted the future President? Joumblat saw himself already as Bonaparte in triumph, but the spectre of the military Bonaparte rose up: the man of the Second Bureau...Chehab the diabolic. Brought to the ministry by the military bureaucracy, Joumblat playing at his own game was going to etray it. He thwarted the plans of the men of the Second Bureau in the Mabassed business, so reinforcing his new image as a man above parties and classes, capable of striking in every direction. This betrayal was badly digested by the men of the Second Bureau: the joke was in. bad taste.
i was Beccosary to acu A new step in the escalation of repression against the fedayeen was taken: the unsuccessful assassination of Riad responsible for Fatah in the south. Joumblat found himself in a bad position: beginning a series of expected outrages against the Palestinian organisations. But the CLAP resolved the problem by breaking off its relations with the government, then with Joumblat himself: presenting its self-criticism before the Lebanese revolutionary left, the CLAP started to establish new, more positive relations with it than in the past.
The meeting of the progressive parties decided to organise a demonstration of protes on Saturday, March 21st. It took place and wa: larger than expected. 25,000 demonstrators from Baathists to the extreme left, carrying in places red flags, and chanting slogans, calling into question the army and the established system.
For the first time such a demonstration took place without the massive compromising attendance as was usual in such cases of the men of the Second Bureau.
The bourgeoisie trembled! It was too much for.it. It was urgent to put an end to it.
Furthermore there was the economic crisis which gripped the country and which the revolutionaries magnified.
Saturday's demonstration was the straw that broke the camel's back. The bourgeoisie's reaction would be the same as every frightened bourgeoisie, as described by Marx in his 18th Brumaire on the subject of the French bourgeoisie:
"Now picture to yourself the French bourgeois, how in the throes of this business panic, his trade-crazy brain is tortured, set in a whirl and stunned by rumours of coups d'etat and the restoration of universal suffrage, by the struggle between parliament and the executive power, by communist plots...and you will The Second Bureau has a decided lack of imagination or perhaps it thinks the memory of the Lebanese people too short. The plot is always so unoriginal that everyone understands The "Phalanges", faithful supporters of th nilitary bureaucracy organised the slaughter of Rahalel7). The place was judiciously chosen: bastion of religious anti-Nasserism, Rahale assassinating the fedayeen, civil war would break out.
The events of 1958 would repeat themselves with their logical consequence: the seizing of power by the army. It seems that in such cases the military takes a leaf out of Hegel. The reading of Marx would have been more useful to them: Hegel made the remark somewhere that all great events and historical persons repeat themselves. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce. 1958 AS TRAGEDY. 1970 AS FARCE As a matter of fact the "spontaneity" of the men of the Second Bureau in the region west of Beirut and that of the "Phalanges" in the Christian districts was completely ridiculous.
The stage setting was too obvious. The lowest point of the farce were the fireworks which the Beirutians had a right to at the Place of the Martyrs. It's necessary to recognise that if the state moves with a frightening slowness over administrative operations, it is rigorously exact over questions of firing. At five o'clock in the afternoon on the stroke of the hour, the farce began.
It would have been very laughable had not innocent people been the victims. ...Bad luck dogged the footsteps of the Second Bureau: the CLAP reacted wisely. Conscious of the plotting. it quickly calmed its troops and denounced the military bureaueracy, avoiding an incensed reaction which would have only profited the army.
Joumblat, the civilian Bonaparte, accused the military Bonapart of breaking the rules of the game. He denounced him too The "National Liberal Party" defender of the liberal economy and enemy of the military bureaucracy, added its voice to the concert.
The whole picture was embellished by the smooth-tongued dramatic announcements of the army on the radio-this great victim screamed of treachery of which it was the object.
The plot had miscarried once again. The Lebanese as the only result are more conscious than ever of the game that is played in the corridors of ministries and palaces.
Bouessir (8), taking his cue from Nasser, played the role of mediator for a fresh return to the previous situation.
The army, pondering its defeat, prepares a new plan. Weapons are sharpened waiting for "the battle of the Presidency".
The Second Bureau has sworn to take its revenge...
WHAT ARE THE PRESENT TASKS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT Until now relegated to second place, spectator rather than an actor, the left must act quickly and effectively:
in the sphere of organisation. After an open action, hardly clandestine at all, it is urgent for it to prepare a possible retreat in case of a possible coup d'etat; that is, to accelerate the process of organisational construction while respecting to the full the rules of clandestinity;
in the military sphere. It is more than ever necessary to create armed militias, the only means of intervening in case of crisis, and more and more an indispensable condition for agitational work among the masses. To rely upon the protection of others can be very dangerous in this sphere.
At the level of politics, the fate of the revolutionary left is linked to the possibility of mobilising the masses. Now such a mobilisation implies clear political bases, a single revolutionary strategy, linking different revolutionary parties.
It is necessary to transform it as a grouping, for the support of the Palestinian revolution, contenting itself at the popular level with pasting up posters of the resistance organisations in a revolutionary front, capable of linking the demands of the Lebanese revolution to the Palestinian revolution, intervening in the framework of its own strategy with its own slogans. The lessons of Mkalles are very useful here.
Today it is urgent to conduct a campaign of methodical propaganda explaining to the oppressed layers of the population the given facts of the situation and preparing them for a future decisive battle. -For the socialist revolution! —For the liberation of Palestine! - Long live the workers' struggle!
G.A. J-P.B. from No.1 of "L'Union", political organ of the U.C.L. (Union Communiste Libanaise-Lebanese Communist Union)
(1) Some officials of the Russian Embassy were experto trom me country accused or organising the theft of a "Mirage" of the Lebanese army on behalf of the Soviet Union. (2) The Second Bureau organised by Chehab after 1958 was for a long time the representative of Nasserite and French interests. In 1969 a reversal of alliances took place: the Second Bureau passed into the service of the Americans (3) Then General-in-Chief of the Army. (4) General Chehab came to the Presidency after the crisis of 1958 and the American intervention. (5) Leader of the "Progressive Socialist Party" of
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lated themselves from the repression e liquidation of the local presence of the inian revolution was postponed. The out-
would incur grave risks in taking such stive, so the Lebanese state, stronger & its ability to exploit the religious
This time the difficulties came from outside: ab reaction was much stronger than foreseen. la and Libya, working in the framework of a ter-offensive by the Soviet Union, took up positions, and what was much worse, (action as a result. Syria closed its frontiers; bya recalled its ambassador, Cairo radio, very