The war in Ireland is not over; it has taken new, more complex forms, but the underlying contradictions, far from overcome, have sharpened. It is only through a very careful analysis that we can come to any logical conclusions. A good example of how to misunderstand is the Workers Press. which for months has been denouncing the IRA as "terrorists", and now accuses them of selling out for calling off their military campaign. This impressionism is a different aspect of the same methodology used by those other forces within the British labour movement who believe that Whitelaw has already won and that the war is over. The experience of Vietnam is opposite; the mere fact of a cease fire and/or negotiations does not mean either that the war is over, or that the liberation forces have sold out.
The Provisionals are a particularly important factor in this situation. If they have called a cease fire because they are demoralised and are unable to carry on a military campaign, then Whitelaw has won. But the evidence points the other way: they have the volunteers and equipment to carry on the fight, and they have declared constantly that this time the Republican forces will not stop short until victory over the British forces in Ireland has been achieved. The peace movement shows the fraying of the political unity of the catholic minority, but it does not demonstrate a hostility to the IRA, or unwillingness to support military action in the event of the British Army or the RUC trying to get into their areas, the other are totally incompatible. But only or if punitive action was to be taken against the IRA. In the face of these facts it would be foolish to assume that the Provos have thrown in their hand.
If the Provisionals had accepted Whitelaw's lets for negotiations there would have been some justification for such a view, but what they have actually done is to counterpose to Whitelaw's terms a set of proposals which British imperialism cannot concede. First they have demanded an All-Ireland conference as opposed to a six-county based one, and second they have presented as the basis from which they will negotiate a programme of demands which, while not posing a socialist revolution in Ireland, do pose the destruction of the entire settlement imposed on Ireland in 1922, and the achievement of self-determination by the Irish people. Both of these will seem eminently reasonable to the mass of the catholic minority but would not be acceptable to British imperialism. So long as the Provisionals maintain these positions they cannot be accused of having sold out.
The present cease fire then is unique; previous truces have been called with Britain's knee on Ireland's throat, they have been compacts between a bleeding and exhausted resistance movement and a British imperialism able not only to dictate the terms of the peace, but to ensure that those terms were later interpreted to its own advantage. This cease fire has been preceded by a clear demonstration of the capacity of the IRA to hit hard against the enemy, and to make any encroachment on the free areas a profitless exercise. Of course, precisely for that reason the political aspects of the struggle are now thrown into sharp relief, and history will judge more harshly any political failures today than has been the case in the past.
CONCESSIONS The bilateral cease-fire has been accompanied by important concessions from the British. In effect West Belfast and other 'no-go' areas are being handed over to the Republicans for them to control. Internment will be ended. All Republican prisoners will be effectively given political status (something that has never been conceded in previous campaigns), there will be a de facto amnesty for men on the run and the Provisionals will be offered a seat, in their own name, at any talks. This last concession means first of all that the sacred British principle of not negotiating with "murderers bites the dust yet again, and secondly that the Provisionals will be able to affect the course which such talks would take, and can prevent the SDLP using them to pose as the representative of the minority. WHITELAW'S PURPOSE The purpose of these concessions is clear, Whitelaw is trying out a new and different method of deflating the IRA; we have analysed his strategy in previous issues of The Red Mole. As we have stated, he has to maintain the balance until the local elections in the Autumn, when he hopes to integrate a section of the minority back into the system. In these elections proportional representation would assist the emergence of a strong force in the centre of Six County politics, in other words the SDLP and the Alliance Party would be strengthened against the Unionist Party on the one hand and the Republicans on the other. Having thus eroded the base of support for the IRA amongst the catholic minority, the British would then proceed to smash it, both as a military and a political force. But Whitelaw's timetable has run into difficulties, it was predicated on pushing Stormont aside, but did not take full account of the effects of pushing the Unionists aside. Whitlaw has run up against the problem that has bedevilled British imperialism time and time again, the fact that any programme of change which would dilute support for the IRA leads to mass disaffection on the part of the protestants. Thus he is at present trying to publicly maintain a balance between the contending forces, at a time when his two props, the SDLP and the Alliance Party, are not able to sustain their own weight let alone his.
Far from the cease-fire representing a prospect of peace in the North, it is more likely to be the lull before new storms. The demands of the Provisionals on the one hand and the UDA on through the erosion of these organisations and the strengthening of the middle class forces in the centre can Whitelaw gain stability, and such an erosion has not yet taken place, and is unlikely to take place before the delicate balance has tipped over, and the North is plunged into a new crisis.
We must now proceed to an examination of the contending forces.
THE DEATH THROES OF UNIONISM The UDA represents the death agony of Unionism. Superficially it might appear surprising that a Protestant movement which aped the IRA has not appeared before, the answer to that question casts light on the real significance of the UDA. The Six County state had been based on a set of sectarian institutions, these included a protestant praetorian guard, the RUC, and a mass armed militia, the 'B'Specials. The protestants therefore had always relied on state institutions to do the catholic-bashing joh for them, and so had no para-military tradition. The mass military displays of the UDA have to be seen in this light, they are a product of the despair of the protestant workers, and their loss of faith in their old institutions. The effect of the abolition of Stormont has been deep and historic. Unionism will never be the same again: the UDA is a demonstration of the weakness and demoralisation of protestant sectarianism, and not a reflection of its growth or strength. The agonising problem for the protestant extremists is how to persuade Britain to maintain the old ascendancy. They have chosen to carry on a campaign of bluff, constantly issuing ultimatums andasconstantly withdrawing at the last moment. They calculate to put pressure on Whitelaw and/or the British ruling class, to win a change or drastic modification in their policy. The problem for them is that Whitelaw knows that it is a bluff, so far the only effect of their actions has been that Whitelaw has used them in turn to pressurise the SDLP. The creation of protestant 'no-go" areas is such a bluff, the British can permit the existence of these in the short term, so long as there seems a prospect of solving the major problem of the catholic free dIcus.
More and more the UDA is being challenged to put up or shut up, either they will have to take direct military action, or a section of their rank and file could get out of hand and take their leadership's rhetoric literally. Given the present tactics of the British ruling class they would probably run themselves onto the bayonets of the British Army. Such a defeat would seriously damage the sectarian monolith. Whatever settlement emerged afterwards it is unlikely that the protestants would be capable of carrying on a long-drawn-out resistance. THE MIDDLE CLASS Of the other forces on the political scene the Alliance Party's potential can only be realised if the Unionist bloc is fragmented. As for the SDLP they are trying to ensure that Whitelaw succeeds in his plans, so as to emerge as the sole political representatives of the catholic minority. They will engage in any deal, any sell out to achieve this. That was why they risked their base in the catholic community in order to go over to Whitelaw before the ending of internment. So far their strategy has not yet been defeated, and they have been able to maintain their position while cuddling up to Whitelaw.
THE OFFICIALS The Official Republicans grabbed a few brief headlines with their cease-fire. However, the reasons which they advance for it represent a wrong assessment of the situation, which if followed to its logical conclusion will destroy their capacity to intervene effectively in the struggle to come. It is true that the North was close to a civil war; but then sectarian violence has been endemic since the foundation of the state. The real difference in the present situation is that the catholics can defend themselves, and the unionist forces are weaker than ever before. Whatever the regrettable effects of a civil war in terms of lives lost, it would neither be a qualitative change in the situation which has existed for fifty years, nor would it lead to the defeat of the catholics; rather the reverse, it would probably represent the last despairing act of Orangeism.
Worse, because more subtle, is the argument that it is necessary at this stage to unite protestant and catholic workers in order to achieve a socialist solution of the Irish problem. The entire experience of the last three years, never mind the last century is that until the Orange state, and the sectarian institutions linked to it, are smashed the protestant workers will seek to preserve them, and that while society in the six counties is sectarian any demand for equal rights means less rights for the protestants and the protestants will resist any progressive demands. There can be no prog ramme for meaningful united struggle of protestant and catholic workers which does not include the smashing of the state, and unfortunately the numbers of protestant workers who will cross the sectarian divide before the smashing of the state will be infinitesimal. To raise unity between catholic and protestant workers as an immediate priority can only lead to one of two conclusions. Either experience will show the impossibility of such a perspective, and demoralisation will set in, or in order to get such unity the demands of the catholics will be de-escalated in an attempt to lessen the gap, thus playing into Whitelaw's hands and preserving the unionist monolith. The most important contribution made by the Official Republicans in the last period was their participation in the armed struggle against British imperialism, now that this has been suspended, they will become less and less able to contribute to the struggle, until they overcome their political errors.
THE PROVISIONALS The fact that the Provisionals have been better able to intervene in the last period will surprise only the dogmatists on the British Left who insist on misunderstanding everything which happens outside their editorial offices. During the present phase of permanent revolution in Ireland, when national struggle is in the forefront, it is only to be expected that the most consistent nationalists will play the leading role. The weaknesses of the Provisionals should not blind anyone to the importance of what they have been able to achieve. They have built up the most effective military resistance to British imperialism seen in Ireland since the Black and Tan war; never for more than fifty years has the British Army faced an adversary so formidable as the Provisional IRA.
We refuse to criticise them for their military strategy; we do not accept that their bombing campaign was sectarian, and we despise those on the British left who have echoed these slanders. The targets of the campaign were on the one hand the British and Six County state forces, and on the other hand the business interests, and the institutions of British imperialism in Ireland. The facts have been confused, because bombs set off by the British SAS and Orange fanatics have been attributed to the Provisionals. The most common accusation is that the Provos have bombed protestant pubs and factories. First they have not bombed any pubs because they were used by protestants but for military and/or security reasons, and second they have bombed factories which represented British investments. That they shou directly affect mostly protestant workers in th way reflects the sectarian employment policy of the state, which the bombs were trying to smash.
The weakness of the Provisionals is not that they are the sectarian, reactionary caricature presented by those who should, but never do. know better; but that their political understan ing is not sufficient to enable them to fight in the most effective way for their objectives. Their political weakness is of two kinds, weak ness of programme, and weakness of cadre. We will try to explain this.
EIRE NUA The programme which the provisionals have advanced is not capable of achieving a socialist transformation in Ireland, therefore it is inadequate in the long term. But because it pose: the destruction of the entire framework set up by the treaty of 1922 it is capable of moving into action the forces which, with a different programme, could achieve a socialist revolutio Because British imperialism wishes to modify, but not destroy the 1922 settlement it will no accept the demands set out by the Provisionals In order to fight for these demands the Provisionals will need to face up to and overcome problems which will require a far deeper understanding of capitalist society, and the natur of socialist revolution than their programme reflects.
A revolutionary programme not only has to se up a model for the new society, it has to creat the forces capable of carrying out the transformation, in other words it has to move the masses into revolutionary action. To do this it needs both to pose a viable alternative to the present partitioned and exploited Ireland and to answer the immediate needs and problems of the Irish people. Their programme Eire Nua sets out an elaborate plan for regiona government, and an ambitious set of constitutional proposals which would give more real democracy than the people enjoy at present, but such a programme is an abstraction when viewed from an embattled street in Creggan: T give any programme of this kind meaning it ha to be based on the extension and strengthening of the present organs of direct democracy which exist in the free areas; this is the primary method by which the masses can be involved in revolutionary action. No doubt mapy British revolutionaries will de nounce us for giving credence to this kind of "community" politics. It is important to understand that the catholic workers are, in the mass, excluded from work in the factories, shipyards, etc. The history and structure of industry in the North affects the consciousness of the working class and means that the main strength of the catholic workers lies in their communities, and not at the point of production. This is an exception to the general laws of revolutionary struggle within capitalist society. Let us make it clear we do not go along with anarchist or centrist concepts of "community control", or try to apply the particular strategy required in the North of Ireland outside that context. DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND POLITI LEADERSHIP The Provisionals will find the danger cropping up, that they could become identified by the masses as responsible for the entire running of the free areas, and therefore responsible for al the problems which arise in these areas, from failure to prevent pilfering, to political confusion within the community. It is here that the other main weakness of the Provisionals will show itself: they do not have the develop political leaders at local level who can act as a means of two way communication between th leadership and the people.
To overcome these problems it is absolutely vital that the people themselves are made responsible for their areas, and that the IRA i not seen as a force imposing its will from out side the community. The only way to solve such problems is, again, the creation of local structures of direct democracy.
It is here that a traditional element of Republicanism comes into conflict with the
get a ready response, it would paralyse the Lynch regime. It is one thing to take action against the Republicans when the masses in the South have illusions in Whitelaw, it is quite another to stop action against the Orangemen. If electrical equipment, Diesel generators, and sibility not simply of Irish revolutionaries, but of their comrades in other countries. Such a contribution is necessary if the theoretical gap between the development of the revolutionary movement in Ireland, and the tasks to which it is called, is to be overcome. It is a very