Pluto Press is doing a great service to the labour movement by publishing a series of what could rightly be called minor classics of the 20th Century workers movement. J.T. Murphy's Preparing for Power definitely falls into this category. It is one of the most useful short histories of the labour movement yet published, starting with the Industrial Revolution and the rise of the modern working class and ending with the perspectives confronting British labour in the 1930's.
The book is more than Listory, however, as its title indicate in apologetic for the author's ow afari from syndicalism through mmunism and stalinism to the centrist bocialist League in the Labour Party, led by Stafford Cripps and Aneurin Bevan.
Several sections of the book should be of particular interest to the new generation of revolutionary socialists who may be unacquainted with these particular periods in working class history. Murphy was a Marxist, who showed the potential of developing into that rarity in British socialism, an outstanding theoretician. This was shown by his recognition of the significance of the shop stewards' movement in 1917 though it was not till after the first world war and the Russian Revolution that he, and others, were able to draw the full revolutionary implications. Unfortunately, Murphy'S theoretical development was to be blunted against the rock of stalinism, but his use of the Marxist methodology in his analyus of the labour movement helps the reader to an understanding of the strengths ind shortcomings of the movement as it developed since the turn of the century. Many younger revolutionaries may be puzzled why Marxism was never able to wir the leadership of the British labour movement even in the distorted form of Continental social-democracy, From Murphy's book it becomes clear that it was the sectarianism of the early "Marxists"
Ied by Hyndman which isolated the revoBitionaries from the main stream of the workers movement. They went to the opposite extreme of the economists and made a frontal attack on the trade unions which only succeeded in antagonizing that movement. Later, when the Labour Party was formed, Hyndman and his supporters failed to recognise the historical importance of what Lenin described as "...the first step to socialism and a class policy for the mass proletarian organisation" (Collected Works, vol. xii, pp 347-348). At that stage, in the Labour Party's infancy, genuine revolutionary Marxists could have played a significant role in its subsequent development.
In the years which followed, the militant wing of the labour movement fell more and more under the influence of syndicalism and the De Leonist brand of "Marxism", whose chief exponent in this coun try was James Connolly. It was in this school that Murphy had his political baptism to emerge as one of the leaders of the PREPARING FOR POWER, by J.T. Murphy (Pluto Press, £3 hard, £1 paper) / George Cunvin Shop Stewards and Workers Committee Movement in the 1914-18 war. As a member of the Socialist Labour Party, he became one of the founders of the Communist Party in 1921.
STALINISM Murphy was in Moscow, as a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, when the fight against Trotskyism began. By this time he had been completely absorbed into the bureaucratic machinery. His critical faculties were blunted and he threw himself into the struggle on Stalin's side. To him fell the dubious honour of moving Trotsky's expulsion from the Communist International.
Stalinism had a particularly disastrous effect on the British Communist Party. It followed blindly the diktats from Moscow and, as a consequence, despite the undoubted militancy of many of its rank and file in the industrial field, was never able to establish itself as an important political factor in the British labour movement. Murphy himself, after his expulsion from the CP in 1932, became, in retrospect, severely critical of the role of the CP and even expressed the thought that the party should never have been established in the first place. By this time, however, he was quite unable to distinguish between Stalinism and the Communism of Lenin and Trotsky, both of whom had striven desperately to try and save the British communists from drowning in the morass of sectarianism.
The weakest section in the book is probably the concluding chapter, "Perspectives and Conclusions". This covers the period of the Socialist League, a "left-wing" development inside the Labour Party, started by that section of the ILP which refused to follow Maxton and Brockway when they led the party to disaffiliation from the Labour Party. Murphy saw salvation in the essentially centrist "Programme of Action" drawn up by the League. For him the road forward to socialism now lay through the Labour Party, if only (ah, if only) the leadership could be changed.
Stafford Cripps and Bevan, the leaders of the Socialist League, eventually became members of His Majesty's Government, in the 1945 Labour cabinet. How far did they take us towards that socialist goal?
This book is valuable as a first-class history of the turbulent years of the labour movement in Britain which marked the first three decades of the 20th Century. From it it is also necessary to face up to the problem which Murphy and his fellow-revolutionaries failed to solve. How can revolutionary Marxists overcome their isolation from the mainstream of British labour and win its leadership? As the leading participant in the St Pancras rent struggle, you will, I hope, allow me to review Jack Lewis's review of the pamphlet by Dave Burn (in The Red Mole, 3 February) and add a few comments of my own. 1 had already reviewed the date and chronological aspects of the draft during summer 72, and would readily subscribe to the accuracy and correctness of details and events as portrayed throughout the narrative.
The role of the Labour Party is also well illustrated although much more could be said of the degenerative and anti-working class policies and attitudes of the local parties, the councillors, Transport House and the two local Labour MPs of that period.
Jack, however, seems to be mainly intrigued with the CP involvement in the struggle. He criticises the lack of detail, accepts certain unsubstantiated propositions that the CP were in the leadership of the struggle, and failing to find any alternative, blames them alone for changing the tenants" policies and for the subsequent defeat of the movement.
He does, however, recognise that the tenants' leadership did not consciously 'sell out' after waging such a fierce struggle, although he identifies myself and others in the leadership, with the CP. 1 accept, of course, that Jack may be making his analysis only on the basis of the pamphlet. It is also possible to reflect on a 12 year old struggle and see more clearly what might have happened.
The real problems of the struggle have certainly not emerged from either the pamphlet or the The main strength of the movement from the beginning resulted from the fact that whilst members of CP, LP and non-party worked together as the leadership of the tenants, neither CP nor LP were allowed to dominate the tenants policies.
The LP made certain vital errors. First, they attempted to take over demonstrations. When this failed, constitutionalism was thrust down the throats of the tenants. This also failed, so in the early days of the actual rent strike (Jan. *60) they descended to out-and-out sabotage, in an attempt to smash the movement, before the movement smashed the Tory council (which almost happened), thus preventing a political advance by tenants and workers totally incomprehensible to these so-called political?) leaders of the working class.
This treachery succeeded in part, but failed to break the mainstream of the movement, which maintained its theat of outright opposition to the Tory rent policy.
The CP played an entirely different role. They chose not to intervene, and were seen as giving all possible assistance and technical aid, yet allowing the tenants to make their own judgments and decisions.
Obviously both CP and LP, as groups, injected their own interpretations of political analysis and policy into the tenants meetings. But the fundamental policies were closely maintained by the tenant leadership.
This, during the struggle up to the evictions, was the tenants' strength. No-one could move them away from their own policies. Indeed, because of this, both CP and LP finally had to concede their own line of policy, and accepted and operated the tenants" policies.
5. EXPLOITATION AND PROFIT Such strength, however, was to become a major weakness, leading to changes which depleted the movement.
Following the evictions, the enormous strains and stresses of the situation led to splits developing amongst the tenants, thus losing the positve and dominant position of strength which gave such correct leadership.
Major revisions of policy by all groups obviously allowed CP and LP opportunities to inject into the tenants' meetings suggestions which changed the course of the tenants, with all concerned being partially responsible for such changes.
The tremendous militancy finally deflated to the level of local elections-whereas at the height of the struggle, the tenants' leaders were prepared to confront the State and all that would be involved.
Jack's summing-up in his final paragraph serves to emphasise a very real problem-one that continually repeats itself.
I would summarise in a different way—a militant situation is not necessarily lost because of wrong political strategy -sometimes the correct strategy just isn't possible. Don Cook Jack Lewis's otherwise excellent review of the pamphlet by Dave Burn surprisingly failed to take up one of the pamphlet's few inaccuracies. Describing the response to the evictions, Dave Burn tells us that about 100 workers from the Shell South Bank site marched in solidarity. In fact, as one of the site committee at the time, I can say that nearer to 2,000 marched. When we arrived at Silverdale, little could be done because of its military geographical setting. At Kennistoun House, following an "absolutely unprovoked" attack by mounted police, we saw a situation possibly unique in "British" working class experience since the end of the second World War - the cops fled: we had smashed them.
From then (some time in the region of 3-4 pm) the leadership of the rent strike dillied and dallied, failing to give a clear decision as to whether they wanted the Shell site (South Bank) workers to evict the cops from Don Cook's flat, promising all the time that more workers were arriving.
More workers did arrive, but not in any large numbers. They came mainly as individuals at knocking-off time. By then, a combination of the long wait (we had been marching since before dinner time), the indecision of the leadership, plus the sickening sight, as we fought our way round the corner of Lady Margaret's Road to Kennistoun House, of a gigantic, ugly butcher's apron (known in polite British circles as the Union Jack) being flown from Don Cook's flat by the rent strikers: all these combined had pissed off most of the (mainly Irish) Shell workers. This made it possible for the C.P. to propose a march out of the (easily defended)
Kennistoun House area to the Town Hall on Euston Road, where, despite and the command experience of the police triumphed. We were dispersed having written yet another "glorious" page in the history of the "British" working class Yours fraternally, Gery Lawless
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fighting until nearly midnight by mainly CP and Irish militants, weight of numbers