alliance advanced north ward to seize control of Sa da Bandeira and then moved on the port of Mocamedes - the seizure of which now allows the supply of arms, so far prevented by the MPLA, to reach the FNLA and UNITA in the south.
Nor is this offensive confined to the south. The FNLA, heavily supported by Lairois troops, and Belgian, Portuguese and French mercenaries, are advancing towards Luanda in an effort to take the city before 11 November - the official date set by the Portuguese in the Alvor Accords for 'independence whilst in Cabinda, a Zairois offensive is being launched against the MPLA.
Offensive
What lies behind this reactionary offensive? First, it is obvious that the anti-capitalist dynamic contained in the mobilisations at the base of the MPLA could not be confined to the borders of Angola, not least because of the economic links that it has with the neighbouring regions. This clearly poses a threat to the stability of all the neighbouring neo-colonial regimes even as far afield as Kenya - and has already severely disrupted the economy of at least one of them, namery cambia.
Secondly, a concurrent explosion of the Rhodesian situation, which seems imminent, will quickly be linked to the dynamic of the Angolan revolution - a link that could It is therefore no surprise that US military aid to Zaire - openly admitted as being for use in Angola has recently increased fivefold to a figure in the region of $80 million; that France has given Mirage F1-11 fighter bombers to Zaire; and that Kenya has also received (though not unrelated to its own domestic situation) arms from the USA and BritNor should the provision of West German technical assistance to South Africa in the development of its nuclear capacity be taken lightly, for it poses a significant threat to the future of the African revolution.
In this explosive situation, all the stops have been pulled out: African diplomacy in the form of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has been mobilised to attempt a reconciliation of the three movements, wnile the fortuguese Foreign Minister, Melo Antunes, is seeking UN backing for his government's declaration that it will only recognise a 'tripartite government in Angola.
The response of the MPLA to all these has correctly been to say that they will accept no compromise with the other pro-imperialist movements, and come what may will "seize power' on 11 November. This was a realistic enough threat at a time when the MPLA controlled the most significant regions of Angola; but with the present full scale intervention by the various imperialist fractions, it could very quickly be turned into a myth.
After a year and a half of rotten compromes with cne agents or im drag the MPLA into a neo-colonial solution, and for attempting to esternment in Angola.
an agreement to disarm the masses. Fortunately, however, they were subsequently able to inflict significant defeats on UNITA and FNLA ership must know that unless the MPLA can consolidate the support of the masses, it could be rapidly eliminated physically by the FLA and its present allies. It is clear, therefore, that in order to lead its struggles to a successful conclusion, its policies and action must be oriented precisely to win the overwhelming support of the masses. But the MPLA leadership has shown itself unable to do this.
for instance, UNITA does not educate the masses as to the reactionary nature of this movement; on the contrary, it does no more than confuse the masses by giving added credibility to UNITA. And even when rejecting an alliance with UNITA, the statements of the MPLA leadership are sufficiently imprecise to leave the door open for new rotten negotiations for future alliances: *UNITA is following the same road as the FNLA, and there is no poss_ red weekly 6 november 1975