stand that it will not be the politicians who will make the revolution in their name; only the masses through their organisation and their struggle will be able to make the socialist revolution triumph' (Poder Popular, weekly of the MES, S-11 November).
Insurrection It is obvious that such an orientation, even if it does not utilise the PRP formulation on "armed insurrection', implies seeing the revolutionary officers and the SUV as sources of a military instrument with which to resolve the question of the seizure of power, which is itself conceived of as a technical complement to the development of organs of popular power (which are, in fact, embryonic, noncentralised, organs of dual power).
On this point, there is a striking analogy between the formula that serves as a governmental slogan in the manifesto of the revolu. tionary officers and the formulation used by the MES in its editorial in the 19-25 Poder Popular: 'We must create the conditions for the formation of a government of revolutionary unity that holds power until the creation of the National People's Assembly.
3. This is accompanied by extraordinary illusions in the Communist Party. The MES claims: "It is not the "revolutionary left" that is being dragged in the wake of the Communist Party, but the Communist Party that, since giving support to the COPCON document systematically at decisive moments of the struggle, has been dragged in the wake of the the revolutionary left ' (Poder Popular, 5-11 November).
In reality, since the beginning of October the Communist Party has taken the initiative again, after having been routed during August and early September. Further, there is no need to insist on the confusion of the MES on the subject of the strategic orientation of the CP, a confusion that explains the group's lack of understanding of the nature and limits of the tactical turns made by Alvaro Cunhal's party.
Ultra-left 4. An ultra-leftist attitude toward the Social Democracy. The MES says: "Thus, the Social Democratic forces serve the advance of the fascist forces; consequently, we cannot seperate our slogan "Death to the ELP [fascist Portuguese Liberation Army] and those who support it" from the slogan "Down with Social Democracy". That, comrades, is why the MES says - and.this is ever more correct and appears ever more clearly - that the Above: right-wing commando chief Jaime Neves, now the darling of the Socialist Party; Below: procovernment tanks presare to move in Social Democracy is a phase in the transition to fascism' (Poder Popular, 5-11 November).
On the basis of their characterisation of the SP, the centrists rejected any coherent policy of united front taking advantage, for example of the tensions that exist within Mario Soares's party because of his opposition to the movement for the demands of the construction workers and metalworkers. Hence the centrist organisations not only consolidated the division of the working class, but also failed to offer any response to the uneven development of the mobilisation in the North and the South - an unevenness linkexl, among other factors, to the varying influence of the SP among the workers of the of the two regions. throughout the country. Democrats)
But on 25-26 November it was not fundamentally the strict military efficiency of the commandos that carried the day. In spite of the profound crisis of the state apparatus and of bourgeois political leadership, what was asserted during these two days was the capacity for centralised initiative still possment. essed by the bourgeoisie despite its weakness.
Militarily, the command of the counter-offensive was coherent and centralised. But we must also note Costa Gomes's cleverness and haste in making sure that the mass media continuity.
carefully. areas.
a crucial instrument of centralisation -would be in the hands of the Government. The broadcasting towers of Portuguese national radio and television were silenced; by eight o'clock at night, the Government was on the airwaves from Oporto, broadcasting its orders Finally, inscribing his response within the framework of the democratic counter-revolution, the president of the republic took care to have the Constituent Assembly vote on the state of emergency. The motion was carried by a majority composed of the SP, PPD (Popular Democrats) and the CDS (Centre The movement initiated by the Tancos paratroopers. the soldiers of the EPAM (Praccember 1975 ss commanded both a fantastic tool for blicising its battles and stimulating liticisation and a possible instrument of itralisation. The bourgeoisie understood s very well. It is thus trying to bring all the ans of mass communication back into its np. In addition, in the realm of written ormation, the administrative councils of newspapers have been modified and rightng editors who had been removed are retaktheir posts. It is not at all impossible that battle around Republica will come up in. 3. The searching of the headquarters of MES, the PRP and the LUAR (League Revolutionary Union and Action) may resent a first step in a policy of selective ression that will initially be carried out und the decree on the 'obligation to return arms' and the decree against 'armed milyet ocen resolved. the social field. ing of a democratic and pluralist socialist society. The participation of the CP in the building of socialism is indispensable.
Because of the present relationship of social forces and the tensions among the various tendencies within the Government, the bourgeois crisis of political leadership has not Some trauma Second, the working class as such has not been hit and the economic crisis is continuing. Of course, because of the many links between workers and soldiers that have been forged during past months, the success of Neves's counter-offensive has certainly produced some trauma among the ranks of the workers. But it would be an exaggeration to claim that the modification of the relationship of forces on the military field will be directly reflected on