IMGpapers

Newspapers of the International Marxist Group and its forerunners, 1968–1988

The failure of the Minority Movement

Red Weekly No. 148, 29 April 1976 · p. 7 of the scan · 1,493 words

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page 7 of the scan

Not even Ernest Bevin's strategy of calling out the workers sector by sector was challenged. In his book on the General Strike, Christopher Farman has well summed up the consequences of this:

*The practical effect of Bevin's strategy was to create a sense of isolation among many of the firstline' strikers, particularly in the big engineering centres like Coventry and the Clyde: to frustrate the hundreds of thousands of trade unionists who, in spite of their own inclinations, were forced to continue working; and to give the Government another week's grace in which to improve its organisation and recruit more volunteers (The General Strike, p155).

It is impossible to say whether a different outcome to the General Strike was possible in 1926. REVOLUTIONARY But a clear and decisive political lead would have allowed the Communist Party to emerge as a mass revolutionary party, strengthening the rank and file against the bureaucracy inside the workers movement in preparation for future struggles.

True, the CP recruited another 4,000 or so members before the year was out, but the new recruits were mainly miners impressed with the financial support given to their struggle by Russian workers. And after the miners were starved back these gains were rapidly lost.

Not only had the General Strike been lost. The Communist Party had missed the most favourable opportunity to date in British history to create a mass revolutionary New three-colour poster which graphically drives home the essential lesson of the General Strike. Price 25p (plus 8p pop trom, general strike roster y Caledonian na. London N.t. neductions on orders over 10-write for details. a week in the early months of 1926.

This turn to the mass organisations required a conscious political break from the syndicalist and sectarian conceptions of the young Communist Party. When its first application for affiliation to the Labour Party was turned down, The Communist of 16 September 1920 snapped back: "So be it. It is their funeral, not ours." A swift rebuff from the Comintern produced a meeker tone a week lat Similarly, it was not until the slump of 1921-22 destroyed the remnants of the Shop Stewards and Workers Committee Movement - with its syndicalist conceptions of factory by factory, industry by industry struggles - that the CP began to look seriously at how to organise the fight against the labour traitors. By the end of 1921 six million workers had suffered wage cuts of 8 shillings a week, while the powertul AC was locked out in 1922 in a battle over overtime and managerial functions.

In this process the intervention of the Third International and its Red International of Labour Unions was crucial. At Is rourn concress in 19ze the hiro International or Comintern adopted a series of theses on the united front. These argued that in the absence of a direct onslaught for power, the major task of the Communist Parties was to develop the united class front of the workers orqanisa tions — to deteno ane aovance tne position. of the working class and through this process ledo une workers towards une struggle ToT Dower. Breakaway Important changes in tactics were involved, including a new approach to the 'yellow' Amsterdam International, the body to which the trade unions still supporting social democracy adhered. Confusion and not a little anger existed in the ranks of the CP. Sneering descriptions o the NMM were given in the party as an •attemot to dress a reo man in a oink cloak' , William Allan, secretary of the revolutionarv breakaway united Mine workers of Scotland, later wrote.

The Sixth Congress of the Communist Party in May 1924 correctly identified the class forces giving rise to the Minority Movement. What was involved was not the simple reinforcement of sectional struggles in this or that union up rank-and-filism - but the development It was the launching of the National Minority Movement in 1924 and the beginning of the Left Wing Movement in the Labour Party which laid the pre-conditions for the emergence of the Communist Party as a significant force in the labour movement. At its height the Minority Movement attracted representatives of 957,000 workers; while the Sunday Worker, the voice of the Left Wing Movement, achieved a stable circulation of 85,000 copies to the labour traitors. nis Tundamenta portical understanding was spelled out in une party s Derspectives.

now springing up in the leading trade unions, industries and the Labour Party are the first expressions of the concrete raising of the demands of the workers leadership. The CP welcomes these minority movements as the sign of the awakening of the workers......

remain sectional, separate and limited in their scope and character. The manv leadership and drive forward relentlessly to the struggle for power.

1924 of a general movement of class opposition *The growing opposition movements and of a definite challenge to the existing (But) the various minority movements cannot realise their power so long as they streams of the rising forces of the workers must be cathered into one powertur mass movement which will sweep away the old particularly successful amongst the miners.

In August 1924, 270 delegates representto launch the National Minority Movement.

minimum and a 44-hour week, the NationThis had been part of the CP's policy since 1922, but it was always coupled with The key to the Minority Movement's -yedi but wile arawine me une acainst an ultra-leftist attempt to by-pass the lefts, the CP was well aware - at the beginning, at least - of the danger of an opportunist adaptation to these forces. Thomas Bell wrote in communist neview vovemoer ..we find the left wing in the main representative of the smaller unions, e.g. Purcell, Bromley, Hicks. In previous years such unions played a very small part. But the increased activity or the masses na made it possible for them to gain prominence and ultimately position in the General Council) by expressing "Left' sentiments on a number of popular subjects...

"Although they are in a minority on the General Council, the Right-wing have had to give way to them because of the popular character of their watchwords. At mme same ume me cerusts are releaser from the necessity of carrying out all their promises in practice by the very fact that, in the main, they are representatives of the smaller unions."

Two months before, Campbell had out..."

written: it would be a suicidal policy however, for the Communist Party and vinority Movement to place too muci reliance on what we have called the official left wing.' Yet it was precisely this warning that the CP leaders were to forget' in the months leading to the General Strike. Swales, Purcell and Hicks were allowed to declaim in the abstract about tne class struccle ano make a cemacooid show of support for the Russian trade unions while failing to make any preparations for the coming strike.

After the strike was over, Robin Page Arnot and J.1. Murpny made all the correc points about the 1925 TUC: "The Scarborough Trades Union Congress showed a ready disposition to pass resolutions of a militant nature, but showed a great disincination to pass resolutions. or evel deal with questions, that necessitated immediate action. ne more uroentand practical the question, the less was it discussed at the Scarborough Congress.' (Communist International, October 1926).

Accommodation The Communist Party's accommoda tion to the lefts could only have a debilit ating erect on me minority Movement True enough, it organised its biggest conTerence, attracting representatives ot nearly a million workers, in March 1926 around the slogan of 'preparedness', and Councils of Action had been functioning under Communist leadership in Glasgow, Edinburgh, Doncaster, Barrow, Sheffield, Liverpool and Birmingham for almost a But the whole line of the Minority Movement leadership up to and during the General Strike was not towards developing the independent activity or councils of Action. It failed to call for a national delegate conference of Council representatives to map out a strategy for winning the General Strike and taking the leadership from the TUC. Nor did it seek to encourage me councis or Acton to taKe on svstematicary ine tasks or serr-cerence and distribution or supolies in oopositio. to the forces of the state and the OMS.

The leadership of the Minority Movement quite consciously called for the subordination of the activities of the Councils of Action to the General Council. George Hardy, acting general secretary of the MM. recalls in Those Stormy Years that on une eve or tne strike we sent out from Minority Move ment headquarters instructions to our members to work for the establishment of Councils of Action in every area. We warned, however, that the Councils of Action were under no circumstances to take over the work of the trade unions... The Councils of Action were to see that all the decisions of the General Council and the union executives were carried

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The General Strike NEXT TIME NO BETRAYAL!

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