tered demands calling for co-ordination of the mass struggle. Referring to the construction workers' amendment seeking to give the TUC power to order unions not to appear before the Industrial Relations Court, Tom Jackson of the Post Office Workers said: If this is the decision of this Congress, we shall not obey The amendment was, of course, defeated. The pattern of expressing 'unity in our views whilst leaving individual unions to act as they might choose, recurred in every single major debate. The boycott of Common Market institutions was carried, in line with the policy of opposition to the Common Market. Yet individual unions are not prevented from sending delegates to the capitalist institutions of the Common Market, such as the European Coal and Steel Community on which the Miners are represented.
Even on one of the major questions facing Congress the pattern remained the same: 'opposition' to the Pay Board was unanimous, but individual unions were left to put their "special cases' to the Board if they wished. On the most important issue of whether to conTurkey -Portal. Torture and Persecution This book documents in detail the torture of political prisoners in Turkey, and the staggering brutality of the methods used.
Faced with a virtual blockade on real news from Turkey, Jane Cousins went there to interview politicians, trade unionists, acade mics, lawyets and many exprisoners.
£1.50 paperback Illustrated 15p post + packing Published by PLUTO PRESS LIMITED Available from:
Red Books 24 Boundary Road, London NW8 The strike at Standard Telephone and Cables, in which black workers fought for seven weeks against racial discrimination on the part of management and a section of the skilled white la bour force, ended last week. This strike was yet another example of racism in the British trade union movement.
The dispute started when the management took a black worker off the job, following a refusal by skilled machine setters (members of the ETU) to continue training him. The ETU has fought for some years against having to train black machine operators as setters. In 1971, when the first black trainee setter was appointed, the setters demanded, and received, a special training bonus of £1.50, although they had previously trained (white) apprentices without Workers Press, organ of the Socialist Labour League, on 10 September asked •Was Racism Behind the Strike at STC?' In this article Lew Britz, ETU district official, is quoted as denying the charge of racism, but he did not explain why the ETU should take action against one black trainee setter, if, as Britz claims, the real issue was allegations made by operators that setters were restricting their pay. Nor did Workers Press ask him.
The SLL covers up for Britz because they They believe that racism, if it exists at all in the working class, can be overcome simply by calling for unity around some other issue. Socialist Worker, paper of the International Socialists, admitted the racism on the part of the white workers, but regarded it as "management inspired. Like the Workers Press they ignore Cecil Gutzmore's report for the Runnymede Trust, which documented management and worker racism in the earlier disputes at STC.
M any Asians at ST were reluctant to strike, even though they too suffer discrimination in promotion, because of fear of deportation under the Immigration Act (this was actually threatened by some white workers). The Strike Committee might have won the Asians over if they had taken up the issue of the Immigration Act and explained that by fighting racism on the picket lines, the Asian workers would have been fighting for a strong Union - their best defence against racist laws. Unfortunately, the Strike Committee began thinking along these lines only at the last moment. • In fact the Strike Committee and regular picketing were set up only after several weeks and regular mass meetings were not held. As a result, strikers were left unaware of all the facts of the situation and could be easily thrown off balance by simple questions from scabs. All of this led to a fall in morale, and a steady trickle back to work.
These failures also reduced the impact the strikers were able to have on the white workers. An appeal could have been made to them on the grounds that they were allowing the management to destroy Union organisation But the poor example of the organisation of the strike made this difficult to put over. The Strike Committee also decided, wrongly, not to organise mass picketing until they knew the results of inter-union discussions. In fact, such a mass picket could have had an impact on these discussions.
The Strike Committee correctly demanded
The key element of his strategy is to bring about the political isolation and military defeat of the Provisional IRA, so that the discontent of the catholic minority can be re-directed through the new political structures with which he is attempting to rescue the Northern Irish state. The Assembly elections had marked a clear advance for this strategy, with the overwhelming trying to preserve. majority of the Catholics not only participating in the election but voting for the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). The British press could hardly contain its delight as it spoke about the rejection of the men of violence' and the "return to politics' by the minority. But in August the Provisionals broke out of their isolation. Mass action on the streets challenged British rule once more, and the Provos, despite severe blows, maintained their capacity to carry on the guerrilla war.
The Assembly elections had marked a clear advance for this strategy, with the overwhelming majority of the Catholics not only participating in the election but voting for the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). The British press could hardly contain its delight as it Road jail made it necessary for them to go on hunger strike for political status. Since the granting of this demand would back up criticisms of the judicial system in the North, Whitelaw had to ignore the appeals of British Labour Party and SDLP MPs, and gamble that Farrell and Canavan would cave in; only thus could he defend an essential part of the state which he is But he flnally had to capitulate when rioting in• Belfast showed that the two People's Democracy comrades had won mass support. The lesson will have got home to the minority - the reformed' Northern Ireland will continually throw up repression which can only be adequateThe struggle of the workers at Lip is a symbol of the development of working class consciousness since May 1968.
Since the May events, not only has the general level of struggle remained very high, but the lessons of 1968 have begun to be assimilated. A working class vanguard has gradually emerged. breaking, even if in a confused way, with the policies of the reformist leaderships. ly met by mass action, on the streets.
That the British are concerned about the situation is confirmed by Heath's visit to Belfast, and his attempt to kick the various Assembly partties into motion. The main bone of contention has been the future of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC); the Faulkner Unionists have adamantly opposed any re-organisation, while the SDLP have been angling for some kind of "community police force in Catholic areas. Heath has given a minor concession to the SDLP: the RUC will remain, but it will be subjected to controls through the local authoricontrol? At Besancon, these questions have taken the form of practical problems on whose solution the future of the movement depends. The ruling class are afraid that this struggle may serve as an example to others - and with good reason. In a recent opinion poll no less than 47% replied YES to the question, 'Do you think the trade unions should develop this new form of struggle?' TEST OF STRENGTH ties. In the "fringe' towns where there is a Catholic majority this gives the SDLP some say in the running of the police. The Catholic ghettoes, however, are still very far from being healthy locations for an RUC uniform (whatever the religious beliefs of its wearer), and this concession will only have a meaning if the Provos are defeated Also in August problems cropped up for the British Government's relations with the South The revelations about the Littlejohns have seriously embarrassed the Cosgrave administration: Heath, during his visit to Dublin, will try to recoup his losses by playing a card which the British Government has kept at the back of the pack the so-called 'Council of Ireland'. This can be held up by both the SDLP and the Southern Government as a concrete advance towards Irish unity; but it is no such thing. As outlined in Whitelaw's Green Paper in October 1972, a Council of Ireland would be concerned with very little except joint security" (i.e. IRAbashing) and would have a built-in limit to its operation, in that the Unionists are unlikely to support it unless it is clearly not a step towards Irish unity.
This requires a great deal of what the capitalist press calls 'empiricism' and 'flexibility' on the part of the British and Southern Governments, and the SDLP: they must try to convince the Southern public and the Northern minority that the discussions are about Irish unity, while convincing the Unionists that they are not. Even the master conjuror Willie Whitelaw will be hard put to pull that particular rabbit out of his hat. And none of this horse trading will alter the basic outlines of Whitelaw's strategy.
To carry out any of the projects now under negotiation Whitelaw must engineer the military defeat of the IRA. In the last three months a determined effort has been made to smash the command structure of the IRA, and deprive it of effective leadership. The arrest of Seamus OF