For the SEL all problems are reducible to the crisis of leadership'. So, like a quack doctor,
Behind the pillared facade of Stormont Castle the Northern Ireland Assembly drones on, locked in debate over whether or not a mace and prayers for the Queen should grace its uncertain future.
Meanwhile, outside in the streets of the cities. and on the border roads the fate of the Assembly, and of the State itself, is being contested by mass civil resistance and bodies of armed men and women.
The seemingly futile arguments which have occupied the Assembly's time fulfil an Important function. For more than a year and a half Whitelaw has spun out the implementstion of his White Paper proposals, making haste slowly, relying on continued political uncertainty to demobilise opposition.
The success of this tactic can be seen in the comparison between the voting in the Assembly elections, and in the local government clections. The massive swing to the SDLP in the Assembly elections was a reaction against the fact that in the local government elections Catholic abstentions, and votes for Republican Clubs and other Catholic candidates, split the vote, and in many areas prevented the SDLP from winning council seats. This was a throwback to the old voting pattem of the minority in the Assembly elections: they voted for the Catholic candidate with the best chance, i.e. in most cases, the SDLP.
PROTESTANT OPPOSITION On the Unionist side the position is even more ambiguous, Brian Faulkner did not fight the clection on the basis of sharing an executive with the SDLP, and he most certainly did not fight on the basis of the Unionist Party being a minority in the Executive. He is being coaxed and kicked into that position by the British Government, and given the choice between shared power or no power at all, he will accept this fate. But he revealed his true feelings at the Tory Party Conference when he attempted to appeal, over the heads of Whitelaw and Heath lor a majority in the Executive.
Faulkner's only advantage is that the fragmentation of the Unionist Party has gone so tat that no credible portion of it is capable of rallying the small bus 1essmen and working class protestants who oppose power sharing and dilution of the protestant ascendancy. Thus although the Fauikner Unionists probably do not have as much grass-roots support as the combined forces of the anti-White Paper Unionists, the Vanguard and the Democratic Unionisis, Faulkner has been able to stitch together enough Assemblymen to go into the Executive.
The relative success of the Brilish Government in the Assembly has tended to obscure another more profound problem the reform of the state apparatus. It was this which brought the O'Neill reforms to grief, for no matter how radically a Unionist Prime Minister might depart from Unionist tradition the state machine remained sectarian STATE SECTARIANISM The SDIP recently walked out of a meeting with one of Whitelaw's aides, Mr. Van Straubenzee, after tailing to get any satisfaction over the continuing discrimination against the minority. The dossier they presented outlined u number of cases in wich RUC chief constables have retused to issue cortreates enabling catbolic small businesses to obtain compensation for damage caused by the actions of Protestant extremist organisations. An Important part of the SIP's base of support is being alienated from the state institutions by this highly discriminatory practice. The dossier also highlighted cases of discrimination by the courts. A Mr. John Brooker of the UDA, who admitted to illegal possession of 650 rounds of ammunition. was eiven a suspenCAMBRIDGE ING PUBLIC MEETING: Gery Ruairi O Bradaigh speaking at the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis ded sentence, while IRA members are being sentenced to up to ten years for possession of smailer quantities.
This sectarianisso in the state apparatus is the submerged reef against which British governi ment initiatives have always foundered. It is the source of the continuing anger and resistance of the minority.
PROVISIONALS STRATEGY The fate of the Northern Irish state, therefore, is still undecided. Either the Executive will be set up, and will gradually enforce its authority. eventually achieving a stabuisation, or the White Paper strategy will be swept away, opening a new phase in the struggle, A great deal hinges on the actions of the Provisional Republicans over the next few months. If they are defeated no other foroc will be capable of stepping into the breach and maintaining the impetus of the mass resistance. It is therefore necessary to examine their strategy caretully.
That strategy was spelled out to the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis on 21 October, in a statement read by Daithi O Conaill:
We shall never see a new Ireland until the British make a commitment to leave our land. That is the There are those who say it cannot be achiered; but Unse were the very people who said Stormont couk not be abolished, It was abolished. We destruyed it and se shall go on to secure a British withdrawal." In Red Heekly20 we pointed out that the Heath/Cosgrave negotiations indicated that the British government is committed to a with drawal, and is now seeking to set up the structurs through which they can continue to control Ireland after they leave. This does not mean that the Provisionals' objective is compatible with that of the British Government; the Provos" aim is to farce a withdrawal before the British have created the pre-requisites for maintalung their control, In the Provos" view a British withdrawal would, under these circumstances, open a struggle to replace the existing stale structures with the "New Ireland" outlined in their programme Eire Nas.
CLEAR OBJECTIVE Just as the overthrow of Stormont provided a focus for the mass struggle after internment, a British withdrawal is a clear cential objective which could open the way to a further development of the Irish revolution. However, there are a number of dangerously wrong political ideas underlying the Provisionals strategy.
They call for the British Government to 'commit itself to a 'phased and orderly withdrawal." This is inadequate on two counts. First it creates the illusion that the British can be forced once mote so bogotagons, b to course or wilica they would relinguish their grip on Ireland. Second, it suggests that the struggle for a British withdrawal can be successful if it limits iseif to that objectise, It is in fact far more likely that the struggle for a British withdrawal will spill over into a more general confrontation with both the Northorn and Southern states, before the British are forced to move in the direction of a withdrawal.
Whitelaw means it when he says that he will not talk to the Provisionals again. British Imperialism will not make the concessions to them that it made to Jomo Kenyatta, or the French made to Ben Bella in Algeria. The Provisionals do not contain the clements of a national bourgeoisie who could be relied upon to maintain a neo-colonial relationship between İrelund and Britain following a British withdrawal, The Irish national bourgeoisie is alive and well, and in power in Dublin. Soober or later Britain means to band over control of the North to them, depending on their succeas with the Executive and the Council of Ireland, The Provisionals must therefore defeat the 26 county bourgeoisie as well as British IraperiaLism, WAR OF ATTRITION Both the Provisonuls and the British Government are engaged in a war of attrition, but the key to victory is not just who can fight longost, but who can consolidate a solid base of popular political support before a resolution of the military conflict.
The British are relying on a power sharing Execulive, piece-mcal reforms, and an alliance with the Southern bourgeoisie, The Provisionals are relying almost entirely on a military campaign. Since the fall of the Free Areas the mass civil resistance in the North has not maintained its impetus and, more seriously, the political resistance in the South has been totally ineffective.
This lag in the mais political strugale reveals most cleariy the political inadequacies of the Provisionals, Their programme Eize Nat provides no perspectives for mass mobilisation: it is not a programme for immediare political action, but a utopian and unrealistic progrunume for the transformation of Ireland after the defeat of the British.
The only way to overcome this gap between the military and political aspects of the Irish revolution is to open up struggles around demands which meet the immediate concern of the masses, North and South, but which have the potential to draw new forces into the struggle, and lead to a sharper and more fundamental confrontation with British Imperialism and its Irish collaborators, This, however, requires a programme which, unlike Eire Nia, makes a real break with the class interests which have kept ireland partitioned for fifty years WiERGE THE STRUGGLES In the North such demands will focus on internment- and British Army repression. The peevish demand of the SDLP at the time of the second anniversary of interament, that the mass demonstrations should cease, indicates its awareness that the position of the SDIP depends upon its ability to pose as the medinto between the British Government and the minority. If the mases in the ghettoes act for themscises the SDIP will relapse into irrelevance.
In the South the strugale must focus on increasing state repression, with the struggle against extradition as its sharpest edgo. As the experico in Britain has shown, state repression rapidly becomes gencralise d There is currently an upsurge of industrial conflict in the South. It is possible to link this up with opposition to reppession aguinst Republicans, and solidarity with the Northern struggle, In this way it will be possible to merge the strugale at the point of production