Interview with members of the LCR-ETA(VI), supporters of the Fourth International in Spain, who explain their position on the assassination, their differences with the group which carried it out, and their perspectives for the struggle ahead First of all, what was the immediate reaction to the execution of Carrero Blanco? In the first few hours, there seems by all accounts to have been a mixture of incomprehension Yes, that's true, The first reactions clearly indicated a state of parslysis insole the regime, and this is important because it gives us a foretaste of what to expect with the death of Franco in the not-too-distant future. One must say that on the technical level it was an extremely impressive operation, and it is easy to see how it would have stunned a regime which, unchallenged for thirty yeurs, thought it could go on in the same way for ever. Hence the first official reaction was quite Simply to reject the idea of a bomb; the statement declared that it was the result of a gas explosion!
Several theories were rife at this stage about the authors of the attack, and it is interesting to note that certain proups inside the regime suspected each other of being behind it. Such confidence is touching' The Spanish Communist Party also took up the version according to which it was a plot by the hardliners of the regime to take over control. But this theory would not stand up-there was nothing of the liberal about Carreto Blanco. On the contrary, he appeared to guarantee the continuation of Francoism after the death of Franco: In any case, what is quite clear is that the whole apparatus of the dictatorship was seriously affected, and that no section of the regime bad the ability or capacity to launch an immediate response to this attack. The army, certainly, provided an element of stability in the situation, but even so there was a mood of alarmed expectancy in the ranks of the ruling class for hours and even days after the explosion.
Several amusing stories are going the rounds about this: there were the mothers in the bourgeois quarters who dashed out to collect their children from their expensive private schools; the banks which had to lock their door because of the rush of people to withdraw their money; or the case of the factory where on learning the news the management simply got up and left their offices.
And on top of this there has been the silence of Franco himsell and his absence trom the funeral of Carrero Blanco.
There seems to have been a show of strength by the Francoists on the occasion of the funeral. Was this a mass mobilisation? What was the reaction in the popular quarters? The execution of Carrero Blanco did not bring the workers into the streets, that's true, but they certainly dids 1 go into mourning either! There was a very favourable response to the operation. Everyone in the working class quarters saw it as a spectacular and hard-hitting blow against the dictatorship.
As for the demonstration on the day of the funeral, there is nothing surprising in the fact that the regime can bring twenty or thirty thousand people out onto the streets. Apart from anything elec, everybody working for the administration In any capacity was mobuised for it. The fact that it was conned to Madrid, and that even bere it was so limited in size, shows on the contrary the narrow social base of the regime. Even after the Burgos trials, at the beginning of 1971, the Francoist mobilisations were bigger than this.
There was another difference: at the funeral the extreme right went no further than threats against the archbishop of Madrid, Tarancon, who is thought to represent the liberal wing in the catholic hicrarchy. It did not take the initiative in launching a cesponse, as it did when a policeman was killed during the last May Day demonscrations.
To come back to the reaction of the workers, the execution of Carrero Blanco did not lead to any street demonstrations apainst the dictatorship. If it had taken place within the frame work of a mass mobilisation, as during Red Weekly 11 January 1974 Page 4 Demonstration of the Workers' Commissions the Burgos trials for instance, it could have had a powerful stimulating effect, But today, largely as a result of the attitude of the Com munist Party, the mobilisation against the trial of the leaders of the Workers' Commissions (the 'Carabanchel 10) has been very inadequate except in Barcelona. The explosion took place ob the same day as the opening of the trial, 20 December, and the subsequent concentration of police in the centre of Madrid was so great that demonstrations could very easily have been mounted in the popular quarters. But nothing had been scriously prepared: any real mobilisation was sabotaged by the CP, while the re volutionary organisations have had to devote miest of their resources recently to defending themselves from repression But it would be completely untrue to pretend that the homb which eliminated Carrero Blanco in any way hindered the mobilisation against the trial of the Carabanchel 10, or that it found no echo inside the working class. The day afterwards, 21 December, you stated your position in a public declaration as follows: *The consequences of this operation seem to us to be positive, as much for the atimulating effect which the execution of Carrero Blanco will have on the masses as for its objective effect in removing a key figure from the ranks of the ruling class. For these reasons we give total support to this action."
Yes, it's important to explain our position fully, In the present case, our support goes further than simple recognition of the unconditional right to use violence, including terrorism, in the struggle against thie Francoist dictatorsbip, one of the most bloodthimity in the history of the world, and beyond simple defence of the militants against repression. That is only the first point-sosolutely necessary, but independent of our estimate of the usefulness of the action, its consequences. and our disagreements with the organisation which it carried out.
With the execution of Carrero Blanco, we have no hesitation in taking a position ol positive support, declaring that the effects of this action are positive and favour the development of mass struggles which alone can overthrow the dictatorship. culminating in a revolutionary general strike.
More than any other, Carsero Blanco embodied the terrorism of the Franco regime. His execution met with a very favourable response, tbe more so as it was carried out within the framework of the struggle against the increasing repression. in the six months of its existence, the Carrero Blanco government had chalked up a notable series of repressive actions: heavy prison sentences against the leaders of the Workers' Commissions; death sentences hang ing over anarchist militants in Barcelona; the murder of revolutionary naticalist militants in the Basque country; and so on No-one believes that the dictatorship will be brought down by knocking off Franco's ministers one by one, not even the comrades of ETA (V), altbough they do have a militarist conception of the confrontation with the State apparatus. But the workers saw this blow struck at the very heart of the regime as an encouragement to struggle, exposing the dictatorship's vulnerability and depriving it of its key clement in the operation to ensure the succession, The removal of Carrero Blanco has weakened the regime and accentuated the conflict between the different sections of the ruling class, all of whom are incapable of assuring a trouble-free transition to Francoism without Franco in the tace of the continued nse in mass struggies, It is obvious that the represaion will be stepped up, but this will only be a sign of the growing crisis of the dictatorship. The response of the masses to the intensification of Francoist terror must therefore be an oftensive one. preparing for the overthrow of the dictatorship. In giving your support to the execution of Carrero Blanco, you are supporting an actioo carried out by ETA (V). However, not only do you have deep programmatic differences with these comrades, but you also reject their conception of the armed struggle against the Of course, Our break, as STA (VI), with the nationalist malitants of ETA in August 1970 was based on fundamental programmatic differences and on an understanding of the dead end to which the mulitarist activism of our organisation bad brought us, ETA (V) sees the struggle against nacional oppression as a national liberation struggle, and not as an cement which white casential is closcly tied in with the whole class struggle at the level of the Spanish state for the overthrow of the Francolst dictatorship and the creation of a federated one alist repuhlic.
Is petty bourecois nationalist ideology has sometimes led it to adopt reactionary positions and even to deny the existence of class confrontation in Euzkadi (the Basque country ). But shows is that the regime has fallen hack on the headlong development of workers' struggle is exposing the glaring contradictions of such conceptions. Today ETA (V) is being forced to link its armed actions to the struggles of the masses. But its activity still remains almost entirely on the military level. It does no serious work in terms of propaganda, agitation and organisation in the factories, the universities or the popular quarters.
ETA (V) sees the overtbrow of the dictatorship as a process of direct confrontation between the State apparatus and the revolutionary organisation, whose courageous actions will arouse the sympathy of the masses and lead to their spontaneous mobilisation. In essence it is a putschist conception which is based on the illusion that the daring actions of a small group of revolutionaries can overthrow the dictatorship without basing themselves on the orginised violence of the working class and its allies.
We think that the armed minority actions of the vanguard nast have the definite aim of contributing to the orgunisation of mass self-defence and vilence, by inserting themselves in the present mass struggles Te has just been announced that Arias Navarro will be the new prime minister.
Yes, that confirms the hardening of the regime confinos that its only perspective is to step up the repression in an attempt to halt the rise of mass struggles, which directly threaten the dictatorship faced as it is with the problem of the succession and the likelihood of an interpational recession.
It is necessary to bear in mind the difficulties with which the operation to ensure the succes sion was prepared, and the decisive role which Саттета Blanco was to play in this, to under stand that in this situation the regune has for the momeot no biternative to hand Carrero Blanco had occupied leading positions for 33 years and was Franco's trusted companion; indeed, he was considered to be more Francist eveo than Franco. Not directly Unked to any grouping. he scerned capable of at least making a stab at replacing Franco in the role of Bonaparte, and of maintaining a halance between the various groupings inside the ruling class.
Arias Navarzo is incapahle of playing such a tole. He has no political ability, no authority He is simply the top cop in the land What the choice of Arias Navarco basically
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