On 18 March 1970, while returning from a visit to the USSR, Norodom Sihanouk, Head of State of Cambodia, learned that he had been deposed in a coup d'etat led by Lon Nol-a one-time friend-and Sirik Matak-another prominent member of the Cambodian ruling elite.
The coup sparked off a massive wave of protest in Cambodia, which was only put down-temporarilyby an equally massive invasion of the country by US and South Vietnamese troops on 30 August. This move was ordered personally by Nixon.
In its turn, this development produceo an ternamonal outcry; Ted by daily TV films of bound and decapitated Cambodian and Vietnamese peasants floating down the Mekong River, together with the destruction of Cambodian rubber plantations and villages by US tanks.
Cambodia had officially entered the Indochinese Revolution.
"Neutralism'
The coup marked the end of two conflicting processes. On the one hand, Sihanouk had failed to build a neutral State, resting on an independent economy, and controlled by a Government which was intended to unite the various classes in Cambodia but only served to focus the conflict on the parliamentary arena.
Sihanouk's manocuvres in the face of numerous conflets, based on dipJomacy and persuasion rather than on the struggling masses, were doomed to failure. Despite all that happened in Cambodia before 1970, Sthanouk never learned that, in an imperialist spoch, the road of independent capitalist development for a poor country is closed off by the forces of the world market, and that there is no middle road between struggle for workers power.
Not did he understand that the economic dependence of small countries on the imperialist powers rules out any prospect of real political independence, Hence the perspective of developing a national bourgeoisie- which would somehow unite the contending classes as well as opposing imperialism was simply an lusion. Thousands of Cambodians have paid with their lives for this mistake.
US failure
On the other hand, the US had failed to force Cambodia into the same subordinate relationship enjoyed by the regimo in Laos and Saigon. The coup succeeded where coonomic and diplomatic pressures, numerous CIA plots, Thai, South Vietnamese and US military expeditions, and daily bombing of Cambodian territory sance 1966 had all previously failed.
Inside Cambodia, the coup produced a rapid crystallisation of the class polarisation that had been developing since the mid-1960s. Within • weck, the National United Front of Cambodia (FUNK) had been formed and was fighting back. This body was based very firmly on the Red Khmers: intellectuals and workers. many of whom had already left Phoom Penh before Sthanouk's Tall, to take up the struggle against what they recognised as a deseloping US puppet elite, It is now four years since the coup. The contending forces are much the same now as they were then, hut the relationship between them is vastly different. The Len Nol regime now control only 10% of the country - the capital, Phnom Penh, and a few towns, all isolatedand even here its control is only maintained by systematic police activity.
Famine and disease are widespread. Supplies can only enter along the Mekong River (along which heavily armoured convoys attempt to pass, with substantial loses) and by air drops, All the High ways are cut by the FUNK, although they allow selected trucks through to allay the starvation of the urhan masser Lon Not's army, the main base of his regime, is now completely unreliable. Whole battalions desert to the Red Khmers when they get the chance, and those that don't simply reluse to fight.
Slaughter
While the US was still bombing Cambodia (before August 1973), until the area had been thoroughly flattened by the B-52s. Now that that has been stopped, they won't move at all. To replace the losses, women and children have been dratted, to be sent to a pathetic slaughter.
As could be expected, there is widespread dissatisfaction. Airforce officers have twice bombed Lon Nol's pulace, and there have been repeated ground attacks by soldiers on local profiteers. There have also been numerous clashes between the police and the army-one of the more spectacular was the bulldozing of a police station by a tank a few months ago.
The only units that are still in any way loyal to the regime are the Khmer Krom. These are a mercenary band originally recruited by the CIA for guerrilla activities again st Sihanouk's Government. They go into battle flying the scull-and-cross bones, and are only loyal because the CIA still pays them, and becaus they know that they will receive no mercy from the Red Khmers.
The Government itself is rotten right through, The base of the regime is almost entirely made up has been widely successful in these areas in raising living standards from near subsistence level to the production of two or even three a collective basis, a free medical aid new schools and hospitals are being built all over the region.
theit previous ago-old subservience, autonomy of ethnic minorities a in the bands of the GRUNK, it is largely exercised through villages and commune committees.
of the dry season has gradually the rocket and artillery bombardthe liberated zones. Most of the as the State offices and Lon Nol's palace, have been hit repeatedly. crops a year. Along with the stabilisation of the economy, by and large on educational programme is in progressWomen have been released from and there are also moves to make the Sihanouk on a recent tour through the liberated zone of Cambodia reality. Although power is formally attacks.
On the military front, the general offensive launched at the heginning escalated. All the roads into Phnom Penh are controlled by the liberation forces. To the problems of famine and drouglit in the capital is added ment which has been in progreas now for several months, witi occasional breaks to allow refugees to leave for of time.
foreign colonies in the capital, as well puppet regime much longer.
Problems
Nevertheless, the FUNK faces serious problems. The inexperience of the cadre in tacing the political problems involved in consolidating the base areas, and that of the guerTillas in open warfare, has led to serious difficulties in defending the liberated zones, as well as the loss of hundreds of lives caused by their inability to cope with airborn These are happily now being overcome, but the crucial problem for the FUNK, that of supplies, is nOL. The niajority of their arms, and all their heavy weaponry, are US made, captured from puppet forces. Their desperate shortage of ammunition is the main reason for the present military (although not political) stalemate, since they are unable to press any offenaive ar mote than one point for any length The Chinese and Russian burcuucrats must therefore bear the responsibility for the continued existence of the Lon Nol regime, They are the only people who could have alded the FUNK with military grant the GRUNK diplomatic recognition What of the future? With the FUNK, the dominant political tendency is undoubtedly the Red Khmers, who gained the leadership in struggle from the "Sihanoukists, who still hold 'neutralist" conceptions and positions.
Sihanouk himself now accepts that he is only a figurehead, completely without any power, und although the Red Khmers canriot yet ditch him because of the personal loyalty the peasants have to him, the tensions between the two (arising out of differences over the deepening of the social revolution) have now been almost finally settled in favour of the Red Khmers The latter recognise clearly that there is no social force in Cambodis between the revolutionaries and the reactionaries. They therefore hold firmly to a programme of 'no compromise.' Their aim is total victory with no concessions, a position which daily exacerbates the contradictions inside the Lon Nol regime, and helps it crumble more and mote Whether these airs can he realised ar not depends esscotially on three factors outside their control. First of all, on the Indochinese Resolution as a whole, since Cambodia although relatively isolated is still an intrinsic part of the revolutionary process as a whole in the ares. The continuation of the revolutionary dynamic in Laos