It is often said that war is the continuation of politics by other means: the Provisionals should learn that politics is simply the continuation of war by other means. The calling of the ceasefire became inevitable as the Provisionals proved more and more unable to get out of the blind alley of their bombing campaign. But the same wrong politics which produced that impasse are continuing to be applied in the new situation.
in the short term, it is obvious that the ending of hostilities - as the most obvious sign of the continued resistance against British imperialism- will be demoralising for the nationalist minority. The ceasefire signifies a setback for the strug gle of the minority. But the longer the bombing campaign in its present form had continued, the more irrel. evant it would have become to the needs of the minority and the more It is to the credit of the Provisonal leadership that they have recognised this. It is because the Provsionals recognise the need for a new orientation that they will fight despite the feeble concessions that they have achieved from British imperialism.
But the self-deluding way that the Provisionals have politically explained their negotiations and stified the ceasefire -their newspaper An Phoblacht says it has been "declared from a position of strength -augurs very badly for any critical assessment of future perspectives.
It is true that the British Govemment itself wants to sce the ending or hostilties for a period -and for that they will make some small Concessions. Hut these concessions won't be made because they are about to be defeated by the Provies. All the British are interested in is wing the lull in the fighting to put together a new 'moderate" coalition composed of elements of the Loyalists and the SDLP, as a way of keeping a life line open towards the Southern Irish ruling class. But even such a moderate block could only emerge on the condition that the fighting spirit of the minority was It Is in this context that the whole agreement on 'policing" is so dangerous. No-one is opposed to the Provisionals getting the best deal they can from the British. But it is disoriented they would have become, the height of lunacy to trust that Rees will keep his word as long as the Provisionals keep theirs.
The only way that any verbal concessions can be guaranteed is through alerting the minority and for the continuation of the ceasefire, mobilising for the defence and extension of such 'concessions. Anything else can only play into the hands of Rees and the British army. The idea that the Provisionals should police' the truce -whatever good intentions the Provisional Jeaders might start with— will, in the actual balance of forces, mean of "law and order The army may be adopting a low profile for the moment, but as one British commentator put it. it is still keeping up its guard. In such a situation, any attempt by the Provisionals to referee any confrontation between the minority This can only lead to further confusion and demoralisation.
the balance of forces by wishful thinking. The dangers are obvious Just from looking at the way that Seamus Loughran, Provisional Sinn Fein leader in the North, is developing. Aller explaining that the Provistonals were setting up vigilantes to police the Catholic areas he said: After consideration, more serious come might he handed over collahoration with the British forces Wonder.
hope tah th and the army can only mean intervening amongst elements of the minority.
The Provisionals cannot change to the British forces of law and Whichever way you look at it, such a statenent implies a clear willugness To collaborale with Brilish imperialism. We can only hope that the Provisional Icadership will dissociate themscives from such proposals. But unfortunately, concessions of this type are built into the very Jogic of the situation.
Rees is playing an extremely delicate game. His project is to hold off the extreme Loyalists until he has time to fudge together some "moderate' bloc. The ceasefire will help him do this by undercutting the support for the more extreme If the SDLP can be guaranteed an overwhelming voice from the minority as a result ol contasion at the Provisionals stance, only slightly more than 10s of Protestants need to be won to melt the extreme Loyalist majority away.
Such a dream is what Rees is gambling on.
It is true that in the next period tensions are bound to increase amongst the extreme Loyalists. But the idea that some back-stage manoeuvrings by Rees will shatter them completely is a pipe dream. Indeed the ongoing quarrel between the para-military thugs and the United Ulster Unionist Council politicians over who gets what after a Loyalist victory in the Convention elections has recently been patched up in a rather ominous way.
A secret cummittee has now app arently been formed which, as the Irish Zomen explained, will bave che function of bringing the paramilitants into policy making and bringine the politicians into planting for extra-parliamentary activity should this become necessary in the event of a Convention breakdown'. The Loyalists notion of a Convention breakdown is any outcome which coesn t give then a majority. Thi 15 what will stymie Rees project.
All in all, the ceastire does not alter the fundamental features of the situation. The minority still has to be crushed and the Loyalists are still after the whole cake, despite Rees. But, the tempo of the inevit able clash between these two irreconcilables has been slowed. The spectre of civil war will recede a little. The 'Uister Roundabout will go for one more turn