Cambodia's late entry into the war, its evious relative tranquillity (due partly to hunouk's Bonapartist policies and partly to en history as a buffer state); the low level of erialist distortion of the economy, and in the relative unimportance of the agrarian estion, and the rapid development of the stancer these were the factors that made up the specific dynamics of the Cambodia trvolution within the framework of Indochina, They were also the factors that prevented the USA from erecting a semi autononious regime in Phaom Penh (unlike in Vietnam), which meant that the puppet regime was heavily dependent right from the start on external aid and interveation. This is what Lde Cambodia the weakest link in the PUPPETS FAIL A number of different strategies were tried, bowever, to consolidate the puppet regime. But the first failure was the coup itinto the strugple brought with it great courage. to rally to Sihanouk's banner.
An attempt was then made to prop up the regime by direct US and South Vietnamese intervention, a strategy which was smashed at the battle of Krek in January 1972. the policy of 'Khmerisation" was shown to be a failure in December 1971. The operation of Chenia il was to be the lust large-scale offenare that Lon Nol could mount. After that his rmy became bogged down in scattered enclaves Senied any initiative in action and forced to sove from one position to the next as the FUNK opened a new front in one province, in switched to another somewhere else.
odian puppet troops - on the verge of collapse In 1973 the USA, baving been forced to pull out of Vietnam, launched a final bid to redress the balance of forces in Indochina by smashing the FUNK. The whole of the US airforce in South Asia was thrown against Cambodia. Several months of saturation bombing (during which more explosive landed on Cambodian soil than was expended in the whole of World War Two inflicted huge casualites on the insurgents. But eventually FUNK consolidated its grip, wearing down the regime's army, tightening its stranglebold on Phnom Pesh and even moving its Govern ment back into Cambodia. The capital and its airport at Pochentong were subjected to artillery barrages unt sabotape, but no real attempt was made cither to block the Mekong river or assault the city-larpely because of their fear that the US might intervene again.
GREAT UNREST
Not surprisingly there was at the same time great unrest within the puppet enclaves. Food prices rose 20-fold, most families conk not afford enough rice to cat, and so there was mass starvation. Now there is about 90% unemployment, and the riel (Cambodian currency) is virtually worthless. There is a shortage of medicines, and diseases which had not been veen since the beginting of the century are now raten their warrant officer came as no surprise to anyone in Cambodia. The army has been gradually deciying over the past five years.
Whole battalions went over to the Red Khmers when they could, and when they couldn't, were only made up by drafting in women, children and invalids who were in turn sent to pathetic slaughser.
The only units that remained completel loyal were the Khmer Krom-bandits recruited by the CIA for guerrilla activity against Sibanouk in the mid-1960s, and well-known for their love of opium, rape and decapitation. They remained loyal to the regime for one rea son only -they knew full well that the Red Khmer would show them no mercy at all.
The Government itself, based on burenucrats und petty capitalists who had grown fat by diverting aid into their own pockets, was rotten to the core. crisis, losing even the support of the bourgeoisic. In 1971, Lon Nol declared that be was going to destroy the resistance. Last year he appealed Tor negotiations. Then a fortnight ago be slipped out of the country on a 'state visit to Indonesia, and is now hiding in Hawall.
OPEN PROTEST
The crisis in the cities early on transformed the initial support for the regime from students and intellectuals into open protest, despite massive repression Periodically the students have launched vigorous attempts to chunge the Similarly, regime. The most recent, in the middle of 1974, led to several days of pitched battles with the police, the occupation of high schools, and the death of the Education Minister. radicalisation is such that the regime dare not even try to conscript them, and this mood hus been transmitted to the working class, who have recently begun to stage small-scale strikes and protests.
At the beginning of this year, the FUNK launched their present offensive with the start of the dry season. Pinom Penh was soon completely isolated. All roads into the capital were cut, with the Mckong river being controlled by the insurgents. The capture of Neuk Luong a fortnight ago meant that there was also no prospect of re-opening it. The only remaining supply route into Phoon Penh-Pochentong airport- was heavily shelled over the last few weeks and seemed on the point of being closed down altogether as we went to press.
Even if enough ammunition could have been shipped into Phnom Penh, there was no Jonger the manpower to use it. The regione became so short of troops that it had to withdraw them from other towns it held, allowing thent to fail to the insurgents.
Recently the town of Kompung Seila (which bad been under siege since May 1974) Tell in this way. Nearer to Phnom Perli, Tannac Totung and Ang Soom were liberated last week, while the village of Tuol Leap, which overlooks the capital's northern defence perineter, was captured the week before. The whole defence line of the capital shrunk back to only a few miles from the centre of the city.
LACK OF RESOURCES The FUNK have faced serious problems which are still not uvercome. Their late entry but also great inexperience whuch has led to several tactical mistakes and losses. Their greatest problem, however, has been that of resources. In the face of the massive aid piven to the puppets by the US, the FUNK has recelved next to nothing. Almost all their weapons and amunition, including the howitzers presently bombarding Phom Pena, arc American made.
unknown what the Red Khmers had to concede to get them.
It slipped from crisis to guerrilas.
LELCHCTETLC
negotiate with the Lon Not clique. collapsed entirely. such alow grogress. For this the Chinese and Russian bureaucrats must take heavy responsi bility. They are the only people who could have materially aided the insurgents, and this they have refused to do. The Chinese only gave sume arms last year-and as yet it is The Russians still give nothing at all, und certainly not the few SAM-s with which the airit! could be halted and the misery brought to a speedy conclusion (of course the bourgeois regimes of Pakistan, Egypt and Syria do not go sort of such wid). In fact, the papper regine uses more Soviet armaments than do the NEEDS OF DETENTE This betrayal does not just cover military hardware. For both the Kremlin and Peking. the interests of peaceful co existence - the detente-come before those of the Indochinese revolution It is true that China Has given refuge to the FUNK leaders, but at no late have they seriously tried to prevent US As for Russia, the Kremlin has oniy furse evicted Lon Nol's envoy from Moscow, It was only after the GRUNK (Royal Government of National Union of Carbodia) had won a victory at the Algerian Conference of "non-aligned" nations and confronted the Lon Nol regime at the United Nations that the USSR grudgingly did an about-face and recognised the GRUNK as the rightful Government of Cambodia.
Within the FUNK itself there have been serious tensions between the "Sihanoukists" and the Communists of the Red Khmers, manly over the question of the social depth of the revolution. These were eased a little when the GRUNK was returned to Cambodia from Peking, and have now finally been resolved in favour of the Red Khmers, who have won their leadership in struggle. Sihanouk now openly admits that he is simply a figurehead, and grudgingly acknowledges the correctness of the line followed by the Ked Ahmen.
NO CONCESSIONS Despite varions political weaknesses, the Red Khmers at least understand that there is no independent social force existing between the revatutionaries and the puppets, und this has led to their firm commitment to total victory without any concessions to imperialism.
Originally they stated that they would not When it became obvious that the US roparded this formula as opering the way to face-savins negot ations. the FUNK issued a statement though Sihanouk that made it quite clear that they were not simply opposed to indondwas but to the whole puppet satisemenon.
The puppet regime is now at its last gaspindeed, by the time this appears, it may bave At the same time, this victory in Cambodia colncides with the tremendous victories of the resistance fighters in Vietnam. A new period is dawning in Indochina-a further step towards the victorious world proletarian revolution.
Material on these pages compiled by DAVID JOHNSON camps. One of the most effective ways of tracing the different periods of the Vietnamese revolution is to look at the movements of the refugees.
After the Geneva Accords of 1954, about R00,000 refugees left the North to go South Almost all were catholics, many of whom were dragged away from their land by threats of excommunication Dire Ebreats were made that the Communists would ban the Virgin Mary, and they were bribed by offers of free land, jobs and money in the South.
Other methods were aiso used. T.D. Allman recounted in the Guardian on & April how the evacuation operation was run by the ClA in Hanoi: Unwary children were bustled into acroplanes as they took off, to ensure their relatives followed on the next one. Then us now, a 'humanitarian" opcration aus used as a cover for ferrying in military supplies: *Before evacuating refugees stampeded into Haiphong by US rumour campaigns, ships of the American "mercy flotilla" cacheu arms in the Tonkin Delta.
The refugees were beartily welcomed when they arrived, and a big propuganda campaign was launched praising these miserable peusants who had voted with their feet. All of tem were comfortably installed in Saigon -many found jahs in the bureaucracy. Not surprising y they constituted the social base, first of President Ngo Dier (assassinated in 1963), and later of his successor Nguyen Van Thieu.
NOT FORTUNATE In the 1960s millions of refugees were created who were not so fortunate, This was the period of the 'strategic hamlet', when villapes were emptied and the people herded into fortified hamlets little different from concentration camps.
As one USAID manifesto explained, *Refugees Make Solid Citizens'. The aim was to 'empty the sea, Le. to depopulate the areas in which the NLT was active and thereby deny them any base. US Ambussador Robert Komer then responsible for the Phoenix Programme of counter-terror, perhaps defined its purpose best If we can attrite the population base of the Victiong, it'l accelerate the process of degrad ing the VC. The casualites were eight million South Vietnamese made bonelessTheir number was then further added to by the hundreds of thousands of peasants driven off their land by defoliation, napalming and saturation bombing by thie US. These people too, were often driven into the concentration The present wave of relugoes arises from
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in August 1973 the USA was forced to call a halt by the weight of international solidarity- still without breaking the hold of the guerillas. During the dry season of 1973/74, the
Conditions were no better in the army. Indeed. a recent report that an army unit had killed and